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The Pricing of Experience Goods: The Example of en primeur Wine 
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The market for “primeur” wine in the Bordeaux region allows producers to sell wine that is 
still in barrels. As with all experience goods, producers send quality signals to uninformed 
buyers. Using original data on Bordeaux wines, we show that the pricing behaviour of 
producers depends to a large extent on their reputation, and much less on short-term changes 
in quality (as measured by experts’ grades). We also find that the primeur price has an 
informative role, since a 10 percent increase in primeur price leads to a 3 percent increase in 
prices on the market for bottled wine. 
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Most food products can be classified as experience goods (Nelson 1970; 1974) because their 
quality can rarely be ascertained before actual consumption.1 A substantial part of the 
theoretical literature dealing with experience goods has focused on sellers’ activity to inform 
consumers in their purchases, particularly the role of signaling and reputation. Prices, 
advertising expenditure (Milgrom and Roberts 1986) and warranties (Grossman 1981) are 
textbook illustrations of how a monopolist can signal the high quality of his product in a game 
with asymmetric information. Shapiro (1983) emphasized the role of reputation in a perfectly 
competitive environment by describing how consumers form rational expectations on the 
quality of experience goods based on the quality of goods produced in the past. 
In the particular case of food products, producers often choose labeling as a signal of 
quality. Bureau and Valceschini (2003) showed that labeling helps promote differentiated 
products and allows small producers to benefit from a well-established collective reputation. 
More generally, the use of food labels is said to create the potential for price premia 
(Henneberry and Armbruster 2003).  
Quantitative measures of these “price premia” are quite rare, as well as, more 
generally, analyses of the pricing strategy and signaling activity of producers in markets for 
food products. This is especially the case when compared with hedonic studies that measure 
the consumers’ assessment of food product attributes (see McCluskey and Loureiro 2003, for 
a review). This article contributes to the empirical literature on experience goods by analysing 
the pricing behaviour of wine producers from the well-known Bordeaux region in France.  
Original data on two markets (for “primeur” wine and for bottled wine) provide a 
unique opportunity to obtain new insights on the pricing strategy of producers. Primeur sales 
refer to a wine sold several months after the harvest, while it is still in barrels.2 At the time of 
primeur sales, the price of the wine (produced by the château for a particular vintage) is 
chosen by each individual producer. We assume that this primeur price depends on the 
 
reputation of the château as well as on short-term changes in quality due to the climatic 
conditions that prevailed during the grape-growing season. Reputation involves the wine 
maker’s know-how, which is measured, according to Shapiro (1983) and Tirole (1996), by the 
quality of the wine produced by the château in the past. It is still an open question how much 
of the producers’ market power is driven by reputation rather than short-term changes in 
quality.  
The wine sold “en primeur” is released onto the market for bottled wines a few months 
after the primeur sales. We might argue that primeur price could be used by the producers as a 
signal of wine quality on the market for bottled wine. If this hypothesis were correct, i.e., if 
consumers are expected to look for a signal on wine quality through primeur pricing, then 
producers might set wine prices accordingly. 
In this study, we first separate the effects of reputation and short-term changes in 
quality, using an analysis of primeur prices to assess their respective impacts on the pricing 
strategy of producers. Secondly, we estimate the effect of the information content of the 
primeur price on the price of bottled wine. We distinguish between reputation based on  
expert grading of wine from previous vintages and “rank”-reputation derived from the 
quality-based rank of the wine itself. The quality-based classification for Bordeaux wines, 
which is region-specific, provides information both on the geographical origin and the rank of 
the wine inside the region.3 The labeling system aims to allow producers to certify certain 
claims about the wine production process. Among other things, it guarantees that the grapes 
are produced in a delimited region and sets the maximum yield allowed per unit area of land. 
Using an unbalanced panel data set of 1,153 wines produced by 132 Bordeaux 
châteaux over fifteen vintages, we find evidence of a large and significant “reputation 
premium” mainly driven by the rank of the château in the classification system. In other 
words, the pricing behaviour of the châteaux during primeur sales, and hence their relative 
 
 
market power, depends largely on the reputation driven by the quality-based rank, and to a 
much lesser extent on the reputation driven by past quality scores. We also find that short-
term changes in wine quality had a very limited influence on the price set by the producers. 
The analysis showed that a 10 percent increase in primeur prices increases subsequent prices 
on the market for bottled wine by around 3 percent. 
The high reputation premium that we estimate on the sub-sample of Bordeaux 
producers provides empirical evidence that the use of food labels may give rise to price 
premia (Henneberry and Armbruster 2003). It also provides empirical support to the statement 
that the labeling system in European wine markets “has proven successful in guaranteeing a 
good reputation for many European wines and relatively high profits for the producers” 
(Giraud-Héraud, Soler, and Tanguy 2002; Marette and Zago 2003). Our results also help 
understand why European wine producers from famous regions such as Bordeaux are against 
the idea of moving from the current system of wine labeling to a differentiation system based 
on grape variety as carried out in countries such as Australia, Chile, South Africa, and the 
United States. If there were no longer any labeling system promoting reputation, then 
producers would have to engage in costly marketing policies in order to be able to compete 
with (much larger) producers from the New World wine countries (Giraud-Héraud, Soler, and 
Tanguy 2002).4 
Our study also contributes to the literature on wine markets. Existing studies are 
mostly concerned with hedonic analyses on bottled wine (for a review, see Lecocq and Visser 
2006). The main findings of these previous studies are qualitatively very similar to the results 
obtained here. Previous authors agree on the larger impact of objective characteristics (vintage 
and region) and reputation (as measured by rank) on wine price. However, they also find a 





Reputation and Quality in the Pricing of Primeur Wine 
Wine prices are set by producers before the opening of the primeur market. We assume that 
sellers know the future quality of their wine at the time of primeur sales and that market 
conditions are such that primeur prices truly reflect information on quality, i.e., the market is 
not susceptible to the “lemons” problem as discussed by Akerlof (1970). A sufficiently high 
fraction of informed buyers acting in the market eliminates the lemons problem (Mahenc 
2004), which we assume to be the case for the Bordeaux primeur market. Furthermore, 
potential buyers are assumed not to be fully informed about wine quality, since wine is not yet 
finished at the time of primeur sales. Potential buyers are thus supposed to form quality 
expectations using information such as the climatic conditions that prevailed during the grape-
growing season and the reputation of the château. Reputation is defined as the quality of the 
wine produced in the past (see Shapiro 1983, and Tirole 1996), which we measure by grades 
attributed to the château for previous vintages and the quality-based rank of the wine. Grades 
are publicly available through numerous guides and reviews such as the Revue du Vin de 
France or the annual “Bordeaux” issue of Wine Spectator, the largest circulation U.S. wine 
magazine.  
Bordeaux wine has been ranked since the nineteenth century within defined 
geographical areas (so-called regions). There are three ranking systems currently in use for 
Bordeaux reds (for a summary, see table 1). 
 
1. The first ranking for wines from the Médoc dates back to 1855, and is largely unchanged to 
this day.5 Wines were classified following a five-tier classification system ranging from top-
quality Premiers Crus or First Growth (denoted here as ME-1) to Cinquièmes Crus or Fifth 
 
 
Growth (ME-5). Later on, in 1920, some of the non-ranked châteaux were classified in a sixth 
group called Crus Bourgeois (ME-6). 
2. Saint Emilion wines, formally classified in 1955 (subsequently revised every ten years), 
follow a three-tier ranking system: Premiers Grands Crus Classés A (SE-1), Premiers Grands 
Crus Classés B (SE-2), and Grands Crus Classés (SE-3). 
3. Wine from the Graves (GR) was officially classified from the beginning of 1953. 
 
[table 1 here] 
 
Our database also contains châteaux belonging to the Pomerol area, which has always refused 
to rank its own wines. 
This region-specific quality-based ranking allows producers to certify that the grapes 
come from a delimited region and that the yield does not exceed a predetermined level. The 
quality-based classification thus enhances wine differentiation, which, combined with 
heterogeneity in wine taste and possible barriers to entry, may drive monopolistic positions 
and thus provide market power especially to the foremost châteaux (Mahenc and Meunier 
2006). In addition to potential market failure due to imperfect competition, the asymmetric 
information between sellers and buyers is likely to create price distortion. This is because 
high-quality producers have an incentive to signal the high quality of their wine through the 
choice of a primeur price (see Shapiro 1983; Mahenc and Meunier 2003; Mahenc 2004). 
Using theoretical arguments, Mahenc and Meunier (2003) have shown that only high primeur 
prices can provide an effective signal of high quality since it is more costly to produce high-
quality than low-quality wine. 
Hence, the “primeur” price function should incorporate “current” quality as well as 
reputation effects, along with some measures of market power and signaling costs. It is 
 
 
important to understand that a price function incorporating quality and reputation effects is 
theoretically consistent with the oligopolistic paradigm, as shown by Shaked and Sutton 
(1982), Tirole (1996) and Mahenc (2004), among others. The Bordeaux grands crus industry 
was indeed chosen as an illustration of an oligopolistic market, with two differentiated goods 
that differ in taste and quality, in Mahenc (2004). 
The primeur price function used here for the empirical analysis incorporates measures 
of quality and reputation, and can be written as: 
 
(1)   , ( ), , , , ,it t it it i i t i itP P VQ WQ LQ R POM VINT vμ= + +
 
where i and t are the index for château and vintage,  respectively (the observation unit is the 
wine produced by château i for vintage t). 
Current wine quality is measured by the two variables VQt and WQit. The overall 
vintage quality, as judged by Wine Spectator (see table A1 in Appendix for more details on 
this particular grade), is denoted as VQt, while wine quality, WQit, is the grade attributed by 
Robert Parker (a famous wine expert and editor of The Wine Advocate) to the bottled wine, 
long after its primeur sales.6 The vintage grade from Wine Spectator provides a good 
approximation of the information on current vintage quality available to consumers during 
primeur sales. Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Lalonde (1995) showed that the overall vintage 
quality was highly correlated with the climatic conditions that prevailed during the growing 
season. The scores attributed by Robert Parker to each wine measure the expected wine 
quality at maturity, an item of information that is assumed to be known by the seller at the 
time of primeur sales.7 
Reputation is measured by two variables (LQ and R), both of which are highly 
correlated with the quality of the wine produced in the past. LQit is the average of lagged 
 
 
quality scores, computed for each wine using all the available data.8 We tried different model 
specifications, in particular the quality score given to the wine produced by the château 
during the last vintage, and an interaction effect between the mean of past quality scores and 
the rank. The model presented here produces the best fit to our data. Ri is a vector of 0/1 
variables, which is used to take account of the rank attributed to the wine in the quality-based 
classification system. We also include a dummy variable for the non-classified wines, which 
groups together both wines from the Pomerol area and non-classified wines from the Médoc, 
Saint Emilion and Graves. As discussed above, the rank effect may incorporate both the 
degree of market power of the château and the signaling cost for high quality. Because of data 
limitations, we are unable to separate these effects. Indeed, we have no information on the 
number of bottles sold by each château at primeur sales, which could have been used to build 
a proxy for the Lerner index. POMi is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the château 
belongs to the Pomerol, which is the only area without any ranking system. 
Finally, we take advantage of the panel form of the data to specify vintage dummies, 
VINTt, and unobserved château-specific effects, iμ . Since we use the Wine Spectator’s grade 
to take account of overall vintage quality, the vintage dummies allow us to check for any 
time-specific effect or market trends that would have affected the pricing behaviour of all 
producers at the same time. The château-specific effect would reflect some “individual 
reputation” premium or, equivalently, market power based on the château’s name. In 
particular, we would expect the unobservable château effect to be larger for famous wines 
belonging to regions without any ranking system (Pomerol in our sample). 
We assume a linear relationship between the primeur price and the explanatory 
variables. The random château effect, iμ , and the usual idiosyncratic error term, vit, are 
assumed to be uncorrelated, while being independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with 




Data and Estimation Results 
In this study, we use a sample of 132 Bordeaux châteaux that produced red wine between 
1983 and 1998, except for the 1984 vintage.10 Overall, 1,153 wines are represented in the 
sample. As the data were provided by one of the most famous broker houses in Bordeaux, 
they can be considered as fairly representative of the market for Bordeaux wines. Primeur 
price is defined as the price of a 75-cl bottle in euro equivalent (base 1990). 
Prices vary considerably across wines in the data set. Figure 1 shows that the trend in 
average primeur price matches the experts’ judgement up until 1995. This seems to be no 
longer the case towards the end of the studied period, particularly for the 1997 vintage, which 
was sold at the highest primeur price despite not being recognized by Wine Spectator as a 
“good” wine. 
 
[figure 1 here] 
 
Table 2 presents some simple statistics showing that average primeur prices match the 
ranking hierarchy: within each ranking, the better the rank, the higher the primeur price. In the 
Médoc classification, for example, the prices of wine belonging to the first-quality group 
(ME-1) are situated largely above the price of wine classified as lower quality, coming from 
ME-2 to ME-6. The last column, NC, groups the non-classified wines from the three regions 
that have adopted a ranking system (Médoc, Saint Emilion, and Graves), and the wines from 
the Pomerol region where no ranking system exists. 
 




The model fitting the logarithm of the primeur price is estimated using the Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) method. We choose the Premiers Grands Crus Classés A from Saint 
Emilion (SE-1) as the reference for the rank dummies, and 1990 as the baseline vintage year. 
Table 3 presents the results of this model specification. In addition to estimated coefficients, 
standard errors, and probability,  this table also reports – in the last two columns - the 95 
percent confidence interval for the “multiplicative” marginal effects of each variable. Since 
the primeur price is expressed as a logarithm, taking the exponential of each estimated 
coefficient gives the multiplicative marginal effect of the corresponding variable (relative to 
the baseline case when considering dummy variables). For example, the marginal effect of not 
being classified has a 95 percent probability of lying in the [0.17,0.35] interval, which means 
that, all other characteristics being equal, a non-classified wine will be priced between 0.17 
and 0.35 times the price of a wine ranked as a Premiers Grands Crus Classés A from Saint 
Emilion. 
 
[table 3 here] 
 
The overall fit of the model is good, since the overall R² value is 0.76 and most of the 
variables are significant at the 99 percent level. Although the two measures of current quality 
(Robert Parker’s wine grade and Wine Spectator’s grade) prove to be highly significant, their 
impact on price is nevertheless rather limited as shown by the multiplicative marginal effect, 
which ranges between 1.00 and 1.02, i.e., a one-point increase in grade has almost no effect 
on the price set by producers.11 The average of past quality scores has an expected positive 
sign, but its influence on price is also very small. Rank-reputation is found to influence 
significantly the pricing behaviour of producers: wines belonging to all other ranks apart from 
the first rank in the Médoc area are priced significantly below wines from rank SE-1 ( the 
 
 
baseline rank), according to the hierarchy of ranking in each area (i.e. the estimated effects 
tend to decrease from ME-2 to ME-6). The multiplicative effects range from 0.13 (ME-6) to 
1.22 (ME-1), the latter being non-significant. In other words, if two wines from the same 
vintage obtain the same grade in Robert Parker’s records, one belonging to the top-group of 
Saint Emilion (SE-1) and the other belonging to the lowest group of Médoc (ME-6), the 
former will still be priced on the primeur market between five and six times the price of the 
latter. These results indicate that there is a high reputation premium attached to the famous 
top ranks in the Médoc and Saint Emilion areas, which could be due to the exercise of market 
power combined with a signaling cost for high quality. 
The decision of the Pomerol châteaux not to establish a quality-based classification 
explains the high significance of the corresponding dummy variable. The strong positive 
effect of the Pomerol indicator (the multiplicative marginal effect ranges between 1.26 and 
1.87) on the primeur price reflects the market power attached to the name of an area 
(designation) that produces famous wine such as Château Petrus. 
Most of the vintage dummies are highly significant with respect to the 1990 base 
vintage. All coefficients are positive, showing that the 1990 vintage, even if judged of very 
good quality, has been priced significantly below vintages of lower quality (see Wine 
Spectator’s grades in table A1 of the Appendix). This last result indicates that market trends 
significantly influence the choice of primeur prices. In particular, we should note the high 
coefficients of the 1996 to 1998 dummies (multiplicative effects range from 1.67 to 2.58) 
when the wine market was flourishing because of the combined effects of the “French 
Paradox”, the assessment of health benefits from wine consumption, and the emergence of 
new buyers from Asian countries. 
Finally, estimation results show that 69 percent of the unexplained model variance is 
due to unobservable château effects. The château effect represents the pricing behaviour of a 
 
 
château over and above the influence of current quality and rank-reputation (or collective 
reputation). A positive château effect indicates that the château has some market power 
provided by its name (individual reputation) and/or is willing to signal high quality by 
choosing high prices. Unobservable château effects can be identified in this model, while the 
statistical description may provide some insights about the heterogeneity in the sampled 
population of châteaux. Analysis of the 132 château effects yields a close-to-normal 
distribution centred on 0 (see figure A1 in Appendix). Table 4 reports some simple statistics 
on the château-specific effects. 
 
[table 4 here] 
 
We show that, for some of the châteaux, the unobserved château effect has a large 
impact on primeur prices. The multiplicative effect is found to range between 0.58 and 2.01, 
and between 0.86 and 1.15 for 50 percent of the châteaux. On the one hand, the estimated 
château effects for the five wines belonging to the first-quality ranking in the Médoc area 
(ME-1) are almost zero, which means that their market power is almost completely captured 
by the rank dummy. On the other hand, the highest estimated château effects very often 
correspond to wines produced by famous non-classified châteaux (in particular, famous 
châteaux from the Pomerol area). These châteaux have some market power driven by their 
own name (individual reputation), rather than the quality-based rank. 
 
The Informative Role of Primeur Price on Spot Price 
Almost a year after the primeur sales, the wine is bottled and released onto the market. The 
price of bottled wine, or spot price, is determined by an interaction between producer supply 
and consumer demand. Consumers’ willingness to pay depends on their expectations about 
 
 
wine quality. The primeur price, which is assumed to be known by the consumer, might play 
the role of a quality signal.12 
In this section, we measure the impact of primeur price on subsequent bottled wine 
prices,13 while checking for the effects of current quality and reputation. If this impact is 
significant, then it will add to the previous analysis by explaining partly the pricing behaviour 
of the châteaux at the time of primeur sales. In particular, we attempt to demonstrate that 
producers might be willing to signal quality on the market for bottled wine through the 
primeur price. 
We use the same panel of 132 châteaux for which we have a five-year series of 
quarterly spot prices (from June 1996 to July 2000).14 Because of large market fluctuations, 
we consider a de-trended spot price.15 We include current quality, as measured by Robert 
Parker’s grade, along with collective reputation through rank dummies and wine age. We 
specify an age-vintage interaction in the model because the relationship between age and price 
of bottled wine is found to be nonlinear and vary across vintages. The average lagged quality 
scores are removed from the model as they prove to be non-significant. We specify a château-
specific effect and use GLS to estimate the model. The total number of observations is 
11,841. Estimation results are presented in table 5. 
 
[table 5 here] 
 
The “goodness of fit” of the model (R²) is 0.86, which means that most of the variation 
in the price of bottled wine is explained by the selected explanatory variables. The 
introduction of the primeur price leads to a significant increase in the predictability of spot 
prices. We show that a 10 percent increase in the primeur price increases the subsequent 
prices of bottled wine by 3 percent. Taken along with the finding that current quality as 
 
 
measured by Robert Parker’s ratings also has a very small impact on bottled wine prices, this 
result reinforces the hypothesis that the primeur price acts as a quality signal for consumers. 
Moreover, this confirms the general findings of empirical studies on commodity futures 
markets (see Cox 1976 or Carter 1999, for a review), which show that the forward price 
conveys some information that increases the predictability of spot prices. However, we should 
note that primeur sales do not have all the typical features of forward contracts, since there is 
no guarantee on the quality of the wine that is going to be delivered.16 
Finally, the impact of ranking is found to be strong, with multiplicative effects ranging 
from 0.19 (lower bound of the interval for ME-6) to 1.28 (upper bound for ME-1). The chi-
square test of equality of the age effect across vintages is rejected at the 1 percent level, 
indicating that the age premium is not the same across vintages of different quality. However, 
the impact of age on the price of bottled wine is somewhat limited, in the same range as the 
impact of quality. Hence, in the case of bottled wine as well, the ranking proves to have the 
strongest impact on price. This latter result highlights the role of labeling, in contrast with 
some published studies measuring the impact of food product labeling on consumers’ 
behaviour. Indeed, Van der Lans et al. (2001) employed a conjoint analysis to show that 
Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) labels have no direct effect on consumer preferences 
in the case of olive oil. Bonnet and Simioni (2001), using a mixed logit model of demand to 
reflect the distribution of consumers’ willingness to pay for labelled cheese (Camembert), 
demonstrated that consumers did not value the quality signal provided by PDO labels for 
these French cheeses. 
The fraction of unexplained variance due to château-specific effects is now reduced to 
38 percent, compared to 69 percent in the primeur price model. The unobserved château 
effects are almost normally distributed (see figure A2 in the Appendix). Simple statistics 
show that the range of multiplicative effects is very close to that reported in the case of 
 
 
primeur price (see table 6). In this model, the random château effect should be interpreted as 
the consumer’s valuation of the name of the château. 
 
[table 6 here] 
 
Conclusion 
Using a large and representative sample of Bordeaux wines, we show that the pricing 
behaviour of producers during primeur sales depends largely on their reputation, and 
particularly on their ranking in the old quality-based classification system. We find that the 
few Médoc and Saint Emilion châteaux belonging to the top ranks set their primeur wine price 
significantly above châteaux belonging to the lower ranks. This high premium may be the 
result of strong market power and/or a high signaling cost. Separate identification of these two 
effects remains an open area for future research. Previous and current wine quality are found 
to have a very limited but significant impact on primeur price. Producers also appear to 
increase primeur prices when the expected demand is high because of a booming wine 
market. 
The second part of the analysis looks at the relationship between spot price and 
primeur price, with reference to the literature on commodity futures markets. However, we 
should be cautious about generalizing our results to other futures markets, since primeur sales 
are informal and there is no guarantee on the quality of wine to be delivered. Nevertheless, 
our study supports the hypothesis that including primeur price in the spot-price function 
increases the predictability of spot prices. 
Together with the low impact of current quality (and the nil impact of past quality as 
measured by grades attributed in the past), this result suggests that the consumers’ belief 
about quality is influenced by primeur prices. The price of bottled wine in the spot price 
 
 
model, which here represents the valuation of wine by consumers, appears to be significantly 
driven by rank issues. These results contradict the findings of previous empirical studies on 
the impact of food product labeling on consumers’ willingness to pay. 
In general, the present study provides some empirical evidence that producers can gain 
price premia by using food labels (Henneberry and Armbruster 2003).  We find that the 
reputation premium - driven by quality-based ranking - is very high in an area such as 
Bordeaux, which benefits from a long-established reputation in wine making. The “reputation 
premium” driven by the quality-based classification significantly outweighs any effect driven 
by objective measures of past quality or the premium associated with short-term changes in 
current quality. These findings help in understanding why most European producers from 
famous regions such as Bordeaux are against the idea of abandoning the current labeling 
system. 
It is somewhat surprising that the New World Wine countries choose product 
differentiation strategies based on names referring to the grape variety used in the production 
of each particular wine, instead of adopting labeling systems based on place of origin and 
quality ranks, which have proved to be successful in Europe. However, we argue that a 
region-specific and quality-based classification will allow producers to gain some reputation 
premium only in areas (e.g., in Europe) where a long-term reputation for wine making already 
exists. This argument is reinforced by the current situation observed in the United States: in 
places where recognition and reputation of a certain quality have increased (Sonoma County 
or Napa Valley, for example), wineries have started changing their marketing strategies by 
placing more emphasis on the origin of the product (Loureiro 2003). 
This analysis was conducted using data covering vintages from 1983 to 1998, a period during 
which the French wine market was steadily growing. French wine is now facing more and 
more competition, especially from New World Wine countries. It would be interesting to 
 
 
conduct a similar analysis on the market for Bordeaux primeur wine using recent data. We 
could then measure whether the pricing strategy of Bordeaux producers has changed, and if 
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1. Food products are sometimes described as credence goods in the sense of Darby and Karni 
(1973) (i.e., some product attributes cannot be accurately evaluated even after consumption), 
for instance, when the production process involves environment-friendly practices. 
2. The primeur market takes place every year in Spring, and represents one of the most 
important events on the Bordeaux market place. This type of sale allows producers to gain 
“cash-in-hand” before the wine is bottled. At the same time, it enables buyers to acquire rare 
wine at potential bargain prices, hence attracting more and more financial speculators (see 
Hadj Ali and Nauges 2003). 
3. Bordeaux wines have been ranked in terms of quality-based classifications since the 
nineteenth century. 
4. The European wine industry is highly fragmented. For instance, the average vineyard size 
in France is less than 2 hectares, compared with 111 hectares in Australia (Marette and Zago 
2003). 
5. Except for one: the château Haut-Brion, which belongs to the Graves area. 
6. Both quality indices rise by unit intervals from a minimum of 50 to a maximum of 100. 
7. In hedonic studies of wine, quality grades given by experts are the most common measure 
of wine quality, see Oczkowski (1994, 2001), Jones and Storchmann (2001), Schamel and 
Anderson (2003), or Lecocq and Visser (2006) for a review. In their hedonic analyses of 
Bordeaux and Burgundy wines,  Combris, Lecocq and Visser (1997 and 2000) have shown 
sensory attributes (such as aroma, body, firmness, etc.) and chemical characteristics (such as 
acid and sugar levels) to be statistically insignificant. 
8. See also Landon and Smith (1997 and 1998) and Oczkowski (2001), who measure 
reputation through lagged quality scores in their hedonic analyses of bottled wine. 
 
9. The normal distribution of unobservable château effects is tested graphically in the 
empirical section. 
10. This vintage was removed from the catalogue by the broker. 
11. Robert Parker’s grade has a small effect on the price chosen by producers, which might 
seem surprising to wine specialists (since Robert Parker is known to be highly influential on 
the Bordeaux wine markets). However, we should bear in mind that this coefficient measures 
the impact of a one-point increase in Parker’s grade, all other wine characteristics (vintage 
and rank) being equal. 
12. We do not discuss further consumers’ perception of quality. It is now common knowledge 
that consumer’s perception of quality is a blend formed by information from multiple sources 
(certification, labeling, brand names, packaging, price, etc.), see Zeithaml (1988) or Rao and 
Monroe (1988) for related discussions.  
13. Primeur price and spot price are clearly linked via arbitrage, which is due to the 
compensation given by the producers to buyers for accepting the price risk of holding primeur 
wine of uncertain quality. From our data, there is only one case where the spot price was less 
than the primeur price, which would be compatible with the Keynesian theory of normal 
backwardation (Keynes 1930). 
14. The broker’s catalogue contains market values for wine computed from the prices listed 
by wholesale wine merchants on the Bordeaux market. 
15. We use a quarterly price index calculated from the regression of the logarithm of price on 
quarter dummies in order to detrend prices. 
16. There has been an attempt to create a futures market for fine Bordeaux wines. In 
September 2001, Euronext, a privately-owned stock exchange created by the merger of the 
Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam stock markets in 2000, launched WineFex, the first futures 
 
 
market for first-quality Bordeaux wines. Winefex did not manage to attract liquidity and was 




Table 1. The Three Ranking Systems for Bordeaux Reds 
Médoc Saint Emilion Graves 
ME-1 (5)* SE-1 (2) GR (21) 
ME-2 (14) SE-2 (11)  
ME-3 (14) SE-3 (55)  
ME-4 (10)   
ME-5 (18)   
   
ME-6 (117)   




Table 2. Average Primeur Price by Rank (Prices in 1990 Euros Equivalent) 
 Médoc Saint Emilion Graves  
 [ME-1 ME-2 ME-3 ME-4 ME-5 ME-6] [SE-1 SE-2 SE-3] [GR] NC* 
Mean 34 15 10 10 9 7 40 16 11 15 16 
St Dev 12 8 2 3 4 2 17 7 5 9 10 
Number of  wines 74 150 75 94 125 136 26 85 133 117 138 




Table 3. GLS Estimation of Parameters in the Primeur Price Model 
Dependent variable: primeur price (log) Coef. Std Err p-value Marginal effects
  [95% conf. int.]
Vintage quality (VQ) – Wine Spectator’s grade 0.019 0.003 0.000 1.01 1.02
Wine quality (WQ) – Parker’s grade 0.006 0.001 0.000 1.00 1.01
Past wine quality (LQ) 0.013 0.002 0.000 1.01 1.02
Ranking (R)   
ME-1 -0.169 0.186 0.364 0.59 1.22
ME-2 -1.005 0.168 0.000 0.26 0.51
ME-3 -1.333 0.177 0.000 0.19 0.37
ME-4 -1.351 0.174 0.000 0.18 0.36
ME-5 -1.457 0.169 0.000 0.17 0.32
ME-6 -1.719 0.165 0.000 0.13 0.25
SE-1 . . . 1.00 1.00
SE-2 -0.889 0.178 0.000 0.29 0.58
SE-3 -1.326 0.166 0.000 0.19 0.37
GR -1.067 0.170 0.000 0.25 0.48
Non-classified -1.406 0.176 0.000 0.17 0.35
Pomerol designation (POM) 0.430 0.101 0.000 1.26 1.87
Vintage effects (VINT)   
VINT83 0.244 0.042 0.000 1.17 1.39
VINT85 0.245 0.028 0.000 1.21 1.35
VINT86 0.045 0.026 0.077 1.00 1.10
VINT87 0.125 0.071 0.081 0.98 1.30
VINT88 0.091 0.026 0.001 1.04 1.15
VINT89 0.148 0.024 0.000 1.11 1.22
VINT90 . . . 1.00 1.00
VINT91 0.181 0.076 0.017 1.03 1.39
VINT92 0.081 0.072 0.264 0.94 1.25
VINT93 0.051 0.045 0.257 0.96 1.15
VINT94 0.134 0.037 0.000 1.06 1.23
VINT95 0.125 0.022 0.000 1.08 1.18
VINT96 0.590 0.039 0.000 1.67 1.95
VINT97 0.854 0.048 0.000 2.14 2.58
VINT98 0.590 0.028 0.000 1.71 1.91
Fraction of variance due to unobservable effects: 0.69 
Total number of observations: 1,153 




Table 4. Château Effects Estimated from Primeur Price Model 
   Quartiles   
 Mean Std Dev 25% 50% 75% Min Max 
Overall 0.000 0.234 -0.147 -0.006 0.143 -0.537 0.699 
 (1.00) (1.26) (0.86) (0.99) (1.15) (0.58) (2.01) 
        
ME-1 0.000 0.012 -0.009 -0.005 0.003 -0.009 0.020 
 (1.00) (1.01) (0.99) (0.99) (1.00) (0.99) (1.02) 




Table 5. GLS Estimation of the Relationship Between Primeur Price and Price of 
Bottled Wine 
Dependent variable: price of bottled wine (log) Coef. Std Err p-value Marginal effects
  [95% conf. int.]
Constant 0.605 0.123 0.000 1.44 2.33
Primeur price (log) 0.309 0.013 0.000 0.28* 0.33*
Wine quality (Parker’s grade) 0.025 0.001 0.000 1.02 1.03
Ranking   
ME-1 -0.001 0.124 0.995 0.78 1.28
ME-2 -0.823 0.113 0.000 0.35 0.55
ME-3 -1.077 0.119 0.000 0.27 0.43
ME-4 -1.147 0.118 0.000 0.25 0.40
ME-5 -1.189 0.115 0.000 0.24 0.38
ME-6 -1.417 0.112 0.000 0.19 0.30
SE-1 . . . 1.00 1.00
SE-2 -0.860 0.120 0.000 0.33 0.54
SE-3 -1.257 0.112 0.000 0.23 0.35
GR -1.081 0.114 0.000 0.27 0.42
Non-classified -1.223 0.119 0.000 0.23 0.37
Pomerol designation 0.302 0.067 0.000 1.19 1.54
Age   
Age x VINT83 0.022 0.001 0.000 1.02 1.03
Age x VINT85 0.025 0.001 0.000 1.02 1.03
Age x VINT86 0.025 0.001 0.000 1.02 1.03
Age x VINT87 0.013 0.001 0.000 1.01 1.02
Age x VINT88 0.024 0.001 0.000 1.02 1.03
Age x VINT89 0.027 0.001 0.000 1.03 1.03
Age x VINT90 0.032 0.001 0.000 1.03 1.03
Age x VINT91 0.010 0.001 0.000 1.01 1.01
Age x VINT92 0.006 0.001 0.000 1.00 1.01
Age x VINT93 0.014 0.001 0.000 1.01 1.02
Age x VINT94 0.013 0.001 0.000 1.01 1.02
Age x VINT95 0.019 0.001 0.000 1.02 1.02
Age x VINT96 0.001 0.001 0.159 1.00 1.00
Age x VINT97 -0.022 0.001 0.000 0.98 0.98
Age x VINT98 -0.020 0.002 0.000 0.98 0.98
Age x Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.00 1.00
Fraction of variance due to unobservable effects: 0.38 
Total number of observations: 11,841 
Total number of châteaux: 132 
R-squared: 0.86 
Note: * Numbers in italics represent elasticities and not multiplicative effects. 
 
 
Table 6. Château Effects Estimated from Spot Price Model 
   Quartiles   
 Mean Std Dev 25% 50% 75% Min Max 
Overall 0.000 0.235 -0.159 -0.015 0.136 -0.476 0.719 
 (1.00) (1.26) (0.85) (0.98) (1.15) (0.62) (2.05) 
        
ME-1 0.000 0.133 -0.039 -0.023 0.003 -0.153 0.213 
 (1.00) (1.14) (0.96) (0.98) (1.00) (0.86) (1.24) 
Note: multiplicative effects in brackets. 
 
 
Table A1. Wine Spectator’s Grades for Vintage Overall Quality 
Vintage year Ratings  
1983 86 (Good to very good) 
1985 93 (Outstanding) 
1986 95 (Classic) 
1987 76 (Average) 
1988 93 (Outstanding) 
1989 98 (Classic) 
1990 97 (Classic) 
1991 72 (Average) 
1992 72 (Average) 
1993 82 (Good to very good) 
1994 85 (Good to very good) 
1995 95 (Classic) 
1996 85 (Good to very good) 
1997 81 (Good to very good) 
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Figure A2. Distribution of estimated château effects – Spot price model 
 
 
 
 
